from an article in Time by Amy Sullivan:
.....While you may not have heard much about this charge against the President, you surely will over the next year. Heading into this election season, the U.S. Catholic bishops are making defense of religious liberty their signature issue. Last week, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops launched an Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty to act as a watchdog to combat what the bishops say is an “assault” on religious freedom by the Obama administration. Religious liberty is the only specific issue scheduled for discussion next month at the bishops’ annual meeting. In announcing the formation of this new committee, Archbishop Timothy Dolan of New York said, “Never before have we faced this kind of challenge to our ability to engage in the public square as people of faith and as a service provider. If we do not act now, the consequence will be grave.”
Read more: http://swampland.time.com/2011/10/07/why-catholic-bishops-are-targeting-obama-on-religious-freedom/#ixzz1aCdhD0kr
editorial: Clock can't run out on sexual abuse crimes
The combination of statute of limitations laws and the understandable difficulties those abused by authority figures have in coming to grips with that abuse results in too many sexual predators escaping punishment for their grievous crimes. That must change in Massachusetts, and it will change this session if Beacon Hill acts upon much-needed legislation.
At a hearing before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary last week, victims testified about the abuse they suffered, the difficulty they had in admitting it .....(more).....
"Church Autonomy" 5
“Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,” by Douglas Laycock. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 7 (Nov., 1981), pp. 1373-1417.
“Freedom to be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy,” Mark E. Chopko and Michael F. Moses. Georgetown Journal Of Law & Public Policy Vol. 3 (2005), pp. 387-452.
“The Waterloo For The So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse And Institutional Cover-Up,” by Marci A. Hamilton. 226 Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 29:1 (2007), pp. 225-245.
________
In this installment we start looking at Mark Chopko's article.
“Freedom to be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy,” Mark E. Chopko and Michael F. Moses. Georgetown Journal Of Law & Public Policy Vol. 3 (2005), pp. 387-452.
“The Waterloo For The So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse And Institutional Cover-Up,” by Marci A. Hamilton. 226 Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 29:1 (2007), pp. 225-245.
________
In this installment we start looking at Mark Chopko's article.
First of all, you have to love a journal article with footnotes (note 75, for one) that cite the New Testament. At least this reference is easily found! As far as peer review goes...we may have to grandfather this one in.
The first sentence of Mark Chopko’s 66 page essay written in 2005 is problematic: "Churches have a right to be free of government control."
Not so, according to Marci Hamilton. On pg. 239 of her 2007 essay, which we will soon consider, she states just as flatly "...there is no constitutional right to autonomy..."
So, which of these is right? Recall, back in 1981, Laycock wrote, just as plainly as Chopko: ". . . churches have a constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference.” Essentially, Chopko, on behalf of the bishops, is piggy-backing on the claims of Laycock and others who seek to broaden the constitutional claims for church’s rights.
Perhaps anticipating sensible objections to the theme of extending rights to organizations (churches) that were intended for individuals (free exercise), Laycock also wrote in the 1981 paper that:
“…The right to church autonomy under the free exercise clause is not dependent on claims of conscientious objection. Individuals exercise their religion in ways not required by conscience, and they do so through organizations. Any interference with the autonomy of these organizations jeopardizes free exercise rights of their members, including the free development of religious doctrine….”
This is a lot to digest.
He sticks up for the right of the individual church member by suggesting that this authority can be transferred to the group. Meanwhile, there are many members of society who have nothing whatsoever to do with the group. Though these other folks are not implicated at this point in Laycock’s argument, they, too, are individuals with rights. We can already sense that the story that Laycock is spinning will not have a happy ending.
Even though the right of free exercise is at the core of his argument, Laycock looks past the individual’s exercise of religion and instead elevates the organization’s exercise of its religion to the prime spot. It can be no accident that many of the legal entitlements that Laycock disfavors in this paper (sanctions designed to enforce the minimum standards of labor and social justice, for example) are often aimed at organizations in their role as employers, landlords, or educational institutions.
I’m not even sure if it’s possible to transfer rights from an individual to a group, as Laycock proposes. When a group is represented by an individual (for example, when a CEO represents a corporation, or, when a Bishop represents parishioners in many of the same lawsuits under consideration here), the opposite is true. We accept this legal fiction of the one substituting for the many for a good reason — because it simplifies things. Whether the many can substitute for the one and thereby gain rights, and in particular new rights that never applied to the individual — that’s different.
I also question where he gets the notion that “…individuals exercise their religion in ways not required by conscience…” They do? How?
This sounds like a non sequitur. Do religious beliefs even exist, if they are not grounded in a conscience? Laycock’s clause not only takes away an essential component (a person’s moral outlook), it also places it where it does not belong and cannot take root (the group). Conscience cannot be shared.
Laycock's conclusion is that the group is allowed to exercise religion in ways not required by conscience. That's the plain meaning of what he wrote. By this logic, “church autonomy” is not only a creative extension of rights, it is also amoral.
Since this so-called right to autonomy is unmoored from human agency and the checks and balances of discussion, collaboration and debate, is it any surprise that it tilts toward the arbitrary and unexplained use of power? That it is capricious? That it can and does produce evil?
Arguments like Laycock’s are the underpinnings of the legal strategies that Chopko and other church lawyers have been advancing for the last 30 years or so. A foundation like that goes a lot way toward explaining why the record of the Catholic church toward abuse victims has been so shameful.
"Church Autonomy" 4
Next post will be about Mark Chopko’s important 2005 article: “Freedom to be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy.”
But first, we back away from the Supreme Count, the Constitution and the national issues and consider a very local issue: the controversy at Mater Dolorosa in Springfield, where the parishioners have been picketing the Bishop’s residence (see article in Springfield Republican of Aug. 18).
In the midst of this Punch and Judy exchange between embattled Diocesan officials and equally determined parishioners, this quote from Mark Dupont, spokesman for Bishop McDonnell, stood out:
Here in embryo, is the chancery’s position: that the parishioners are unlawful; that they promote disharmony; that they have no right to make demands; that only if they are willing to work “through the parish” will they be heard.
The last phrase is the same as expecting the parishioners to work through “parish leadership”, which the chancery has been advocating ever since the dispute over the closing began.
Here it's useful to have a Magic Catholic Decoder Ring, which I happen to own. For the truth is that “parish leadership” and working “through the parish” are code. Ostensibly “parish” would seem to be a collective noun. On the contrary, to the chancery these phrases mean working with and through only one man. Namely, the pastor, Fr. Alex.
We know this because for long stretches of time the parishioners, led by Peter Stasz and Victor Anop, asked for a copy of the engineering report which recommended closure of the church because of safety issues. The answer from the chancery, after much stonewalling, was that it was not necessary to let the parishioners see the report because it had already been disclosed to “parish leadership”. By which they meant Fr. Alex.
When the issue finally came to a head because of questions raised by local news media (and, not coincidentally because the church became occupied by rebellious parishioners) Elliot St. finally broke down and gave a copy of the report to the parishioners.
The latest statement by Mr. Dupont shows once again the hypocrisy of the official Diocesan position. The claim is made that the parishioners need to quit the occupation in order to start working “through the parish.” Is it not clear that this change in the dynamics would all but ensure that Fr. Alex could control the ebb and flow of dialog and subsequent action? And that the distinction is being drawn between the rights of the parishioners apart from the pastor? And that apart from the pastor, the parishioners in fact have no rights?
In this case the change in the dynamics hoped for by the chancery would very likely entail the swift end of the occupation and the appearance of a rather large yellow bulldozer at the church doorstep.
When legitimate demands of parishioners are seen as unlawful; when these demands are said to promote disharmony; when they are told they have no right to make demands; when they can only work “through the parish” (the pastor) or through the “parish leadership” (the pastor); all of these conditions can be summed up in two words, “church autonomy”.
The local arena for this oppressive “church autonomy” is not civil vs. church, but rather clergy vs. people.
To make this point in a not quite local but not quite national setting, look at the way that the clergy in Boston treat Peter Borre.
I'm sure that many of the clergy in Boston feel that Peter promotes disharmony, unlawful behavior, and is guilty of refusing to work "through the parish leadership" as well. In all likelihood the clergy in Boston, for the most part, would like Peter Borre to take a long walk off a short pier into Boston Harbor.
And yet there is a simple explanation for their attitude. Peter understands that "church autonomy", as practiced by this generation of bishops, is a fraud. Not only that, but he has the audacity to spread the word.
But first, we back away from the Supreme Count, the Constitution and the national issues and consider a very local issue: the controversy at Mater Dolorosa in Springfield, where the parishioners have been picketing the Bishop’s residence (see article in Springfield Republican of Aug. 18).
In the midst of this Punch and Judy exchange between embattled Diocesan officials and equally determined parishioners, this quote from Mark Dupont, spokesman for Bishop McDonnell, stood out:
“We don’t believe this unlawful occupation and the disharmony they have created within the community has earned them the right to make any demands. Certainly, once they have relinquished this vigil we are more than willing to consider any requests they have made through the parish.”
Here in embryo, is the chancery’s position: that the parishioners are unlawful; that they promote disharmony; that they have no right to make demands; that only if they are willing to work “through the parish” will they be heard.
The last phrase is the same as expecting the parishioners to work through “parish leadership”, which the chancery has been advocating ever since the dispute over the closing began.
Here it's useful to have a Magic Catholic Decoder Ring, which I happen to own. For the truth is that “parish leadership” and working “through the parish” are code. Ostensibly “parish” would seem to be a collective noun. On the contrary, to the chancery these phrases mean working with and through only one man. Namely, the pastor, Fr. Alex.
We know this because for long stretches of time the parishioners, led by Peter Stasz and Victor Anop, asked for a copy of the engineering report which recommended closure of the church because of safety issues. The answer from the chancery, after much stonewalling, was that it was not necessary to let the parishioners see the report because it had already been disclosed to “parish leadership”. By which they meant Fr. Alex.
When the issue finally came to a head because of questions raised by local news media (and, not coincidentally because the church became occupied by rebellious parishioners) Elliot St. finally broke down and gave a copy of the report to the parishioners.
The latest statement by Mr. Dupont shows once again the hypocrisy of the official Diocesan position. The claim is made that the parishioners need to quit the occupation in order to start working “through the parish.” Is it not clear that this change in the dynamics would all but ensure that Fr. Alex could control the ebb and flow of dialog and subsequent action? And that the distinction is being drawn between the rights of the parishioners apart from the pastor? And that apart from the pastor, the parishioners in fact have no rights?
In this case the change in the dynamics hoped for by the chancery would very likely entail the swift end of the occupation and the appearance of a rather large yellow bulldozer at the church doorstep.
When legitimate demands of parishioners are seen as unlawful; when these demands are said to promote disharmony; when they are told they have no right to make demands; when they can only work “through the parish” (the pastor) or through the “parish leadership” (the pastor); all of these conditions can be summed up in two words, “church autonomy”.
The local arena for this oppressive “church autonomy” is not civil vs. church, but rather clergy vs. people.
To make this point in a not quite local but not quite national setting, look at the way that the clergy in Boston treat Peter Borre.
I'm sure that many of the clergy in Boston feel that Peter promotes disharmony, unlawful behavior, and is guilty of refusing to work "through the parish leadership" as well. In all likelihood the clergy in Boston, for the most part, would like Peter Borre to take a long walk off a short pier into Boston Harbor.
And yet there is a simple explanation for their attitude. Peter understands that "church autonomy", as practiced by this generation of bishops, is a fraud. Not only that, but he has the audacity to spread the word.
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